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Introduction 
While common sense suggests that increased defense expenditures are 
likely to harm a less developed country's (LDC's) development efforts, 
economic theory does not provide any clear prediction of how the net 
impact of an increase in the military burden would influence growth, 
development, or welfare. 1 Classical theory, for example, would predict 
on the basis of resource allocation that increases in defense will de-
crease investment and/or civilian consumption and thus reduce growth 
or welfare. Keynesian theory, on the other hand, implies that in the 
presence of inadequate effective demand the operation of the income 
multiplier would imply an increase in national product, resulting from 
additional defense expenditures. Thus, there are purely economic 
rationales for increased military spending. More specifically, for econ-
omies operating with substantial excess capacity, additional demand 
and output from expanded military expenditure will increase capacity 
utilization, thereby increasing the rate of profit and possibly accelerat-
ing investment. Whether in the short and long run the former or latter 
effect dominates will determine the final outcome of defense on 
growth.2 
While a seemingly straightforward exercise, to date empirical tests 
of the defense-growth relationship have not yielded any general con-
clusions as to the net impact of increased allocations to defense, with 
some indicating negative effects and several others finding positive 
associations. 3 Clearly part of the problem here lies in the fact that Third 
World countries are far from homogeneous-one would expect the 
impact of increased defense expenditures on the Brazilian economy to 
be somewhat different than that experienced in Chad. Similarly, coun-
tries with an indigenous arms industry should experience ceteris 
paribus somewhat different defense/income multipliers than those 
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found in nonproducing nations where ceteris paribus a larger propor-
tion of increased military expenditures is likely to wind up in imported 
weapons. 
The purpose of this article is, therefore, to examine the defense-
growth debate from a new perspective. An attempt will be made to 
determine the possible role indigenous arms production may play in 
affecting the manner in which defense expenditures have an impact on 
the local economy. Does the possession of a domestic arms industry 
result in a significantly different pattern of economic impacts stemming 
from increased allocations to defense?4 
( 
Impact of Military Expenditures on Consumption and Investment 
Without excess capacity, increased military expenditures will reduce 
either civilian consumption or else capital formation and thus growth. 
A priori the impact of the military burden on private consumption after 
controlling for savings, government revenues, and the resource bal-
ance could either be positive or negative. 5 However, taxes and savings 
should reduce the share of private consumption in GDP, with larger 
deficits in the balance of payments facilitating increases in the share of 
consumption in GDP: 








share of private consumption in GDP 1982; 
= average savings rate 1970-81; 
resource balance as a percentage of GDP 1982; 
= government resource as a percentage of GDP 1982; 
government resource as a percentage of GDP 1981; 
= per capita military expenditures, 1981. 
For the nonproducers: 
PRB = - .49 AS - .33 RBB - .41 RTCRYB + .56 MEP 
(-2.44) (-3.27) (-2.58) (3.47) (1) 
df = 30; R2 = .751; F = 19.04. 
For the producers: 
PRB = - .77 AS - .18 RBB - .03 RTCRYB 
( -5.38) ( -1.46) ( -1.02) 
df = 17; R2 = .768; F =.18.48. 
.75 MEP 
(-5.26) (2) 
An interesting pattern therefore exists whereby the military bur-
den appears to be associated with higher consumption in the non-arms-
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producing countries. In sharp contrast, increases in the military burden 
appear to come at the expense of consumption in the arms-producing 
nations. 
In contrast, the impact of the military burden on the share of 
investment in GDP (GDIB) is reversed; that is, the military burden is 
associated with increased levels of investment in the arms-producing 
countries and decreased levels of investment in the nonproducing 
countries. More specifically, for nonproduc~rs: 
GDIB = .88 AS - .61 RBB + .48 GETYB .41 MEP 
(6.47) (-4.57) (4.31) (-3.59) (3) 
df = 29; R2 = .775; F = 20.08; 
for producers: 
GDIB = .98 AS - .74 RBB - .42 GETYB + .55 MEP 
(6.05) ( -4.34) (-1.35) (2.86) (4) 
df = 17; R2 = .762; F = 10.41, 
where GDIB = the share of investment in GDP, 1982; and GETYB = 
the share of government expenditure in GDP, 1981. 
How can these differential impacts of the defense burden-
increased investment and reduced consumption-associated with in-
creased defense burdens in the arms-producing countries and vice 
versa for nonproducers, be explained? 
Interestingly enough, these results are consistent with those likely 
to be found as a result of economic disarticulation.6 Particularly in the 
case of semi-industrialized LDCs, there is likely to be a group of dy-
namic leading industries specializing in production of automobiles, ma-
chinery, consumer durables, and military equipment. Higher arms 
spending selectively stimulates demand for products from precisely 
these sectors. The resulting output increases require employment of 
relatively skillecf and managerial workers at high incomes; their "mod-
em" tastes as consumers give rise to a second round ofleading sector 
demand. If extra demand were met by diversion of capacity from in-
dustries producing commodities favored by less skilled workers and 
the poor, then the stage would be set for a growth process supported by 
a squeeze on wage goods. Investment would be stimulated by the 
increase in output in leading sectors, adding still more demand pres-
sure. There would be additional generation of high income consumer 
purchases and so on. The whole process operates under a resource 
constraint, but it is evaded by diversion of capacity from sectors pro-
ducing wage goods in the process; only the poor lose by slow growth of 
production in commodities suited to their needs. 7 
The net effect might also be to lower the overall output to capital 
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ratio, as observed above for the arms producers, due to the fact that 
wage goods tend to be more labor intensive than arms production or 
consumer durables. This sort of mechanism can support faster growth 
when there are significant differences in consumption patterns between 
poor and rich, for example, in demands for food and consumer dur-
ables. 
The net effect in the arms-producing countries would be a more 
likely increase (than in the case of nonproducers) in investment (due to 
direct linkages) and declines in overall private consumption (since 
lower income groups consume a higher proportion of their incomes) 
associated with increases in the military burden. While the same in-
vestment and consumption could conceivably occur in the arms-
producing countries, the likelihood is that there would be much less. In 
fact, these countries might experience a more direct positive relation-
ship between added personnel and consumption with increased mili-
tary burdens and reduced levels of investment due to few direct link-
ages associated with an increased military burden. These are precisely 
the patterns for arms and non-arms producers identified by the empir-
ical analysis above. 
Impact of Military Expenditures on Public Consumption 
If the above interpretation of the impact of military expenditures on 
investment and private consumption is correct, we would also expect 
certain impacts to exist between the military burden and public con-
sumption. In particular, the arms producers would experience a posi-
tive relationship between the military burden and public consump-
tion-due to on-going local expenditures, salaries, and so on. 
As D. K. Whynes notes, in countries with defense industries, a 
substantial portion of military expenditures is oriented toward longer 
term investments in these industries. 8 The military officials are, there-
fore, under constant pressure to ensure a continual supply of funds 
over the projects' lives. Clearly, this problem is particularly prevalent 
in cases where the initial project,costs are low and, therefore, more 
attractive to the treasury. Once committed to defense production, ad-
ditional expenditure will usually be granted over and above the previ-
ous estimates to prevent resource wastage (the stoppage of production 
and/or noncompletion of projects), although at extra cost. 
In addition, stability between public cohsumption and the military 
burden exists in arms-producing countries because the military sector 
often has the potential to serve as an effective fiscal regulator as it is 
related to the civil economy. The government, for example, often 
places weapons production contracts with private manufacturing firms 
to expand demand during recessionary periods. Furthermore, and 
more significant, the military sector is the one major area of the modem 
Robert E. Looney 149 
economy that is under the direct control of the central government. 
Economic expansion, therefore, can be affected immediately by, say, 
the ordering of a new weapons system; in contrast, indirect policies, 
such as a marginal tax change, would take a much longer period to 
produce noticeable multiplier effects. Such control is also useful in the 
possible event of excessive expansion of the economy as weapons 
systems can be immediately cancelled or contracted to help deflate the 
system.9 
If this interpretation of the linkages existing between military in-
dustries and the budgetary process is correct, we would expect the 
linkages between public consumption and the military burden to be 
weak or nonexistent in the nQn-arms-producing countries (compared 
with those in the arms-producing countrifs). 
In arms-producing countries, therefore, increases in the military 
burden should increase the share of public consumption (PCB) in GDP. 
Due to the special demand shift profiles outlined above, however, in-
creases in public consumption per se would not necessarily occur at 
the expense of overall rates of investment or consumption. Empiri-
cally, tests of this hypothesis yielded for the nonproducers: 
PCB = - .28 RBB - .38 AS + .80 RTCRYB - .16 MEP 
(-1.63) (-1.77) (3.21) (-.57) (5) 
df = 28; R2 = .459; F = 5.21; 
for producers: 
PCB = .15 RBB - .20 AS + .02 RTCRYB + .87 MEP 
(.87) ( - .92) (.41) (6.03) (6) 
df = 16; R2 = .814; F = 15.63. 
The results obtained in examining the impact of the military bur-
den on public consumption are in conformity with the linkages postu-
lated above, that is, sgong positive linkages occurring between the 
military burden and the share of public consumption (PCB) in GDP for 
arms producers, and insignificant linkages between the military burden 
and public consumption for the nonproducers. 
Apparently, therefore, once this regulation system linking produc-
tion to the budget in arms-producing countries is in place, several 
groups of people will find it economically advantageous to maintain the 
status quo. These groups include senior soldiers, the owners and man-
agers of private industries (with which the government places defense 
contracts), and politicians whose careers are tied to the defense sector. 
Together, these groups clearly wield considerable economic and polit-
ical power-enough to establish a stable and predictable relationship 
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between military expenditures and overall public-sector expendi-
tures .10 
Inflationary Impacts of Defense Expenditures 
It is possible that the linkages between the defense burden and con-
sumption observed for the arms-producing countries could be caused 
by inflation, instead of the mechanisms outlined above, and by the 
resulting forced savings impact on private cpnsumption (together with 
a stimulating impact on overall investment). According to this line of 
reasoning, one might also expect the inflationary impact of increased 
defense expenditures to be greater for the arms producers (due to 
capacity constraints and policies of domestic absorption), whereas 
non-arms producers could, in part, meet added military burdens 
through constant price imports. 
In fact, one can easily argue that defense spending raises demand 
without increasing supply and, therefore, that it does not contribute to 
current or future standards of living. Moreover, because more of this 
spending goes to the procurement of capital goods than do other forms 
of government spending, it is more inflationary. It is also less resistant 
to price and wage increases as military procurement from domestic 
suppliers is often negotiated on a cost-plus basis. Thus, defense spend-
ing may be disproportionately a cause of cost push inflation. 
Finally, because officials are usually reluctant either to raise taxes 
or to cut back other spending in order to finance additional defense 
expenditures, their resort to budget deficits and public debt tends to 
generate further inflationary pressure. 11 
According to this line of reasoning, the inflationary impacts of 
increased military burdens might be expected to be higher in the arms-
producing countries. To test for the inflationary impact of increased 
defense burdens, a simple model was developed whereby inflation be-
tween 1970 and 1982 (INFB) was postulated to be influenced positively 
by: (1) inflation in the 1960-70 period (INF A)-to control for high or 
low inflation countries; (2) the average military burden (MEYA) as a 
percent of GDP 1970-82; and (3) the average share of public consump-
tion in GDP 1970-82 (PCB). Public consumption was introduced to 
correct for any biases that might occur from high correlations bet~een 
overall public-sector consumption and the military burden, that is; the 
higher the share of public consumption in GDP, ceteris paribus, the 
greater the aggregate consumption demand and the fewer the private-
sector consumer goods available to meet that demand. 
The results for the producing countries were: 
INFB = .62 PCB + .80 INF A - 2.19 MEY A 
(3.09) (7.71) (-2.19) (7) 
df = 17; R2 = .854; F = 27.49; 
Robert E. Looney 151 
while for the nonproducers: 
INFB = .21 PCB + .76 INFA + .02 MEYA 
(-2.14) (7.79) (0.24) (8) 
df = 28; R2 = .614; F = 12.36. 
The negative impact of the military burden in the producing coun-
tries clearly invalidates the forced savings explanation offalling private 
consumption and increa~~d investment found with increased military 
burdens. The income distributional demand profile alternation and re-
source shift mechanism outlined above (in the discussion of private 
consumption) tends to be supported, or at least not invalidated, by the 
observed patterns of military burden and inflation. 
With regard to the impact of defense expenditures on growth, 
while E. Benoit's suggestion that defense spending could encourage 
fuller utilization of the existing productive facilities may be particularly 
relevant for the defense producers, it has much less relevance for the 
nonproducers. 12 The latter countries are likely to be more constrained 
by supply. The supposed benefits of defense spending may simply 
impose additional burdens on the economy through expanded salaries 
and so forth, producing excess demand for goods and services in gen-
eral. The net result might well be slower, rather than faster, economic 
growth. 
The Impact of Military Expenditures on Overall Growth 
The analysis in the previous sections suggests several mechanisms 
through which increased military burdens may have an impact on the 
growth process, depending on whether the country is an arms pro-
ducer. As shown above, arms producers are characterized by a shift in 
income from households to the public sector associated with increases 
in the military burden. While this shift does not appear to be infla-
tionary in itself, there is ~ason to believe the net impact on income 
distribution may be regressive. In sharp contrast, non-arms producers 
appear to shift resources toward the private sector (in the form of 
increased consumption) as the military burden increases. 
A priori one can argue that the net impact of these income distribu-
tional shifts might be one of increased or decreased growth. A logical 
case could also be that, given the many other factors impinging on 
Third World growth rates, the overall impact of increased military 
burdens is likely to be rather insignificant. 
The role of the military burden (MEY) in effecting overall growth 
in Third World countries was examined, as shown below, by determin-
ing its impact on the margin after other growth inducing and inhibiting 
factors had been accounted for. 13 
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average rate of growth of real GDP, 1970-82; 
the growth in investment, 1970-82; 
the rate of inflation 1970-82; 
the average resource balance as a percentage of GDP, 
1970-82; ( 
average share of military expenditures in GNP, 1970-82. 
The results for arms-producing countries: 
GDPGB = .74 GDIGB - .29 INFB + .40 RBB + .35 MEYA 
(3.80) ( -1.62) (2.62) (2.09) 
df = 19; R2 = .736; F = 10.50; (9) 
for the nonproducers: 
GDPGB = .92 GDIGB - .15 INFB + .05 RBB - .59 MEY A 
(7.24) (-1.87) (.52) ( -4.23) 
df = 45; R2 = .639; F = 19.27. (10) 
Again, a contrasting pattern appears, whereby the military burden 
tends to inhibit growth in the nonproducing countries and stimulate it 
in the producing countries. 
Conclusions 
The orthodox view of indigenous Third World arms industries is that, 
as an economic strategy, the benefits of industrialization through arma-
ment are questionable: arms production is expensive in terms of do-
mestic resource costs, especially SCa{~e scientific and technical skills. 14 
It depends on extensive imports of-components and technology with 
consequent reliance on arms manufacturers in the industrialized coun-
tries. Rapid obsolescence of technology and expensive high risk prod-
uct development make the returns uncertain. 
Much of the analysis underlying this conclusion is descriptive and 
anecdotal with little empirical analysis applied to the problem. The 
results presented here, while not necessarily contradicting the or-
thodox view, tend to place the indigenous arms industry in a different 
light; that is, it appears that the macro-linkages from the arms industry 
to the economy enable Third Worltl arms producers to minimize most 
of the adverse impacts on the economy often associated with increased 
military burdens. The mechanism through which this process occurs, 
however, appears to worsen overall income distribution through the 
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shifting of resources from wage goods to investment and durables. 
Clearly, the political costs stemming from this process must be care-
fully assessed before advocating the establishment of an indigenous 
arms industry. 
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